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Social Reconstruction as a Local Process
Laura Arriaza∗ and Naomi Roht-Arriaza†
Abstract1
When it comes to post-armed conflict interventions aimed at restructuring a shattered
society, policy makers have largely treated countries as an undifferentiated whole, ignor-
ing local dynamics that reinforce or transform the power relations that are often most
relevant to peoples’ lives. Using the example of Guatemala, the authors argue that local-
level, bottom-up mechanisms can reflect a country’s diverse makeup and experience of
conflict, and provide crucial precursors or extensions for wider-scale national and interna-
tional projects. Local-level initiatives also can involve more community members, promote
agency and perhaps be less prone to large-scale patronage and corruption. In promoting
truth-telling initiatives and confronting the past, memorializing the departed and burying
the dead, and resolving ongoing or recent community conflicts, the authors have found
that local-level programs have distinct advantages. The article considers local ‘houses of
memory,’ community-sponsored psycho-social interventions and exhumations; and con-
flict resolution based on Mayan methods. It concludes that such efforts should be more
systematically identified and supported in post-armed conflict settings. In transitional jus-
tice, as elsewhere, the authors find, all politics is local.
Introduction
We are now at the 20-year mark, more or less, of efforts to create a sustainable
peace after widespread repression or armed conflict. A whole agenda – and a
whole set of institutions and professionals – has emerged to implement ‘transitional
justice’ interventions, from truth commissions to international trials to reparations
programs and security-sector reform. These interventions have all been aimed at
creating new national narratives, establishing a new, healthier relationship between
citizens and state and ensuring through knowledge and action that atrocities will
‘never again’ be the norm. Yet, in many places, it is far from clear that such
interventions, no matter how well meaning, well executed or even necessary, have
made a difference in the lives of ordinary people.
We argue that there are two main reasons why these efforts have not translated
more fully into changes in lived experience and perception. The first reason, which
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Social Reconstruction as a Local Process 153
is largely beyond the scope of this article, is the continuing lack of social and
economic justice. In most post-armed conflict countries,2 people are poorer than
ever, the formal political system continues to be dominated by elites, discrimi-
nation and exclusion of minorities (or sometimes majorities) is rampant, crime
continues unabated and the economy is largely dominated by large landholders,
‘warlords’ and various types of smugglers. The second reason, and the focus of this
article, is that national-level initiatives by themselves are insufficient to capture
the meaning of the conflict for people living in specific villages, towns, ‘hills’ or
other local spaces, whose experience may vary widely from that of people else-
where in the country. When it comes to post-armed conflict interventions aimed
at reconstructing a shattered society, international and national policy makers have
treated each country as an undifferentiated whole. This approach is useful in terms
of establishing global norms and creating a national (re)founding mythology3 –
undertakings that can only be carried out on a uniform basis and by a state. Such ef-
forts, however, ignore existing local dynamics aimed at reinforcing or transforming
the power relations that are often most relevant to peoples’ lives, especially given
the perennial weakness of the central state. In transitional justice, as elsewhere, all
politics is local.
We are not arguing only that national-level initiatives should have a regional
aspect or component – something which has been done4 – but also that individuals
assessing past efforts and contemplating new ones should look at independent
initiatives arising from the local level as an integral part of the post-armed conflict
justice landscape. They should incorporate a perspective that encompasses bottom-
up local efforts as well as top-down state-driven or internationally driven ones.
Such local-level efforts often precede formal national-level initiatives, and they can
follow on or extend national-level programs, making them more locally relevant.
They are particularly important to unraveling the complexities of local power
dynamics and to addressing the spectrum of culpabilities at a local level, which do
not lend themselves easily to treatment through criminal law. They may tap more
easily into the agency of survivors and be less prone to large-scale patronage and
corruption. At the very least, designers of national and international initiatives
should strive to be aware of, and not to undermine, local-level processes.
We illustrate our point with the case of Guatemala. From 1960 to 1996, some
200,000 people were killed in Guatemala in waves of government repression and
armed conflict. In 1996, peace accords were signed that promised extensive re-
forms. Efforts have been made to establish a historical record of the nature and
consequences of the conflict. The United Nations-sponsored Commission for
Historical Clarification (CEH) heard some 8,000 testimonies and compiled an
2 Although ‘post-conflict’ is the conventional terminology utilized, ‘post-armed conflict’ is used in
this article deliberately to highlight the fact that no society is without conflict, even if this no longer
takes the form of armed actions.
3 See, Richard Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-
Apartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
4 See, for example, the work program of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.













154 L. Arriaza and N. Roht-Arriaza
extensive record of the historical causes, nature and consequences of the conflict,
presenting a detailed report with recommendations.5 A second, unofficial report
sponsored by the Catholic Church and released by the Recovery of Historical
Memory Project (REMHI) included a large number of testimonies on horrendous
crimes, most from the primarily Mayan, mountainous areas of western and north-
ern Guatemala.6 The ambitious though troubled National Reparations Program
(Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, or PNR) has distributed some checks to wid-
ows and other victims of the conflict. A few trials in notorious cases have resulted
in convictions, although the justice system remains compromised and ineffective.
In sum, despite limitations and halfway measures, Guatemala has enacted many
items on the ‘transitional justice’ agenda. Nonetheless, over 10 years after the peace
accords, Guatemala remains a deeply wounded society.
The first section of this article describes the nature of the conflict in Guatemala.
The second explores the shortcomings of existing national and international efforts
at social reconstruction and transformation from the perspective of the local.7 The
third section provides examples of local-level efforts in different parts of the coun-
try, including ‘houses of memory’; community-sponsored psycho-social inter-
ventions; community-initiated exhumations; and mediation based on the Mayan
‘cosmovision.’ We conclude that local-level efforts should be more systematically
identified and supported in post-armed conflict settings as both building blocks
and complements to a national approach. We also argue that assessments of the
reach of post-armed conflict justice efforts should include local-level initiatives.
The Complex Nature of Conflict and Post-armed Conflict
Landscapes
A starting point for our argument is the inevitable variation in how armed conflict
develops and is experienced within a country. Geographic accessibility, ethnic or
religious makeup, political affiliations and an overlay of local history and conflicts
mean that the extent and patterns of armed conflict vary. Moreover, conflicts
generally are a combination of vertical and horizontal types; that is, in some places
the violence runs from an organized state apparatus to a (more or less) unarmed
civil society, while in others the predominant form pits neighbor against neighbor
and militia against militia, with varying degrees of state control or condonation.
The conflict in Guatemala included both types.
The armed conflict in Guatemala began, depending on who is counting, with
the Spanish invasion in the 16th century, with the overthrow of the democrat-
ically elected Arbenz government by CIA-backed mercenaries in 1954 or with
5 Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence (CEH, 1999).
6 Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REMHI), Guatemala Nunca Más (Office of Human Rights
of the Archbishop of Guatemala, 1998).
7 These efforts are sometimes referred to as reconciliation. We prefer the term social reconstruction,
although we add that this implies a transformative element, not simply a return to an unjust status
quo. See also, Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation,’ Human Rights Quarterly 24(3) (2002): 573–639.













Social Reconstruction as a Local Process 155
the rebellion of young army officers against the resulting dictatorship in 1960. In
practice, most of the violence at issue today stems from selective state repression
of outlawed opposition parties, trade unions, peasant leagues, student organiza-
tions and other such groups in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the violence escalated, as
the army put down armed revolutionary movements that had grown roots in the
indigenous population of the western highlands. The government’s strategies in-
cluded bombings, massacres, scorched-earth policies, hunting down refugees and
concentrating survivors in army-controlled ‘model villages.’ Most of the victims
were Mayan peasants. According to the CEH, acts of genocide against Mayans were
carried out in at least four areas of the country.8 Of the killings, disappearances,
torture and destruction that occurred during the conflict, the CEH found the army
responsible for 93 percent. Over 600 villages were destroyed, sometimes with no
survivors. Women were raped on a massive scale, children and old people were
targeted as bearers of culture and crops, forests and livestock were destroyed. The
conflict devastated a broad swath of the country.
Layered on top of this state violence is a host of complexities. Guatemala is divided
into more than 20 language groups that live in different but overlapping regions,
usually in valleys that make communication between the different communities
difficult. The population has different histories, social composition and cultural
practices. During the conflict, some areas had Mayan communities living next to
ladino ones, others had a ladino minority that held local economic and/or political
power within largely Mayan towns and still others had no ladinos.9 Some areas
saw land or water disputes or rising tensions between Catholics and Evangelical
Christians. While some regions were wiped out by the army or experienced selective
attacks on community leaders, others, such as the largely ladino eastern region of
the country, remained practically untouched by the violence.
The army played on and exacerbated geographic and social divisions, as well
as personal feuds within a community. For example, it issued identity cards that
allowed freedom of movement to Evangelicals but not to Catholics, who were
widely viewed as supporters of the insurgency. Army repression was aimed at
replacing traditional religious and civic authorities with people aligned with the
military. These individuals in turn benefited by their association, acquiring the
lands (and sometimes widows) of those killed. Most important, the army created
paramilitary forces known as Civil Defense Patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil,
or PACs) that served as the eyes and ears of the military in their villages and were
used as cannon fodder to sweep areas where the army expected guerrilla activity.
8 CEH, supra n 5 at vol. III. For accounts of the destruction of Mayan communities, see, for example,
Robert M. Carmack, ed., Harvest of Violence: The Mayan Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1988); Victoria Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in
Guatemala (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
9 In Guatemala, ladino refers to people who self-identify as non-Indian through their use of the
Spanish language, non-use of traditional dress and the like. The majority of the Guatemalan popu-
lation belongs to indigenous groups descended from the pre-Columbian inhabitants of the region.
Although these groups self-identify largely based on language and place of origin (Ki’che, Kequ’chi,
K’achiquel, Achı́, etc.), in the last few years, they have also begun to self-identify as Maya. Maya will
be used here to refer to the indigenous population as a whole.
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The paramilitary groups committed many of the atrocities of the period, including
some of the worst massacres. Some PAC members voluntarily took advantage of
army sponsorship to settle old scores with neighbors or neighboring villages, or
to amass wealth and local power. At the same time, a substantial number of civil
patrollers were Mayan men intimidated or forced to join on pain of death. Most PAC
members were indigenous, while their commanding officers were predominantly
ladino and often local military commissioners. Thus, ‘society was transformed by
the army’s coerced integration of the rural indigenous majority into its counter-
insurgency design, with negative effects for indigenous and religious practices.’10
Like most armed conflicts, the Guatemalan had both ‘vertical’ (state/citizenry)
and ‘horizontal’ (neighbor/neighbor) aspects, with the relative weight of each
varying among localities. Adding to this complexity was the net of complicities,
betrayals and duress designed by the army to tear apart the bonds that hold
communities together. Many families had members in both the guerrillas and the
PAC, and many were forced to collaborate or to betray family and friends. PAC
members were told that if they did not adequately repress the local population,
they themselves would be killed as presumptive insurgent sympathizers. The army
in a number of cases forced PAC members to publicly kill other PAC members
for being supposed guerilla collaborators.11 Worse, PACs and the army together at
times forced villagers, and sometimes an entire village, to participate in the public
killing or torture of community members or in the desecration of their bodies.12
These events continue to divide and traumatize communities.
In the post-war period, conflicts within and between communities continue,
exacerbated by the newly elevated position of some ex-PAC members as compared
to the almost uniform destitution of their victims. Some regions mostly house
communities of residents who never left, while other regions include refugees
who returned to settle in their old communities or were forced to make their
homes in new places, which has created tensions with existing residents.13 Some
returning refugees found others living in their homes and farming their land.14 In
some communities, everyone is a massacre survivor, while in others, local power
is held by ex-PAC members. In some communities, certain traditional authorities
10 Rachel Sieder, ‘War, Peace, and Memory Politics in Central America,’ in The Politics of Memory:
Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-
Enrı́quez and Paloma Aguilar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 165.
11 See the discussion of such events in the villages of Cucabaj and Zacualpa, Quiche, in, CEH, supra
n 5 at vol. III, Illustrative Cases 43 and 53.
12 See, for example, Illustrative Case 107 (Acul massacre) in, CEH, supra n 5 at vol. III. See also,
REMHI, supra n 6 at vol. 1, 35, which details forced collaboration as a way of promoting collective
complicity and the normalization of violence. Such practices have been a feature of many recent
conflicts. See, for example the report of the Sierra Leone TRC, ‘Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’ (Freetown: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004), available at
http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/index.shtml, especially vol. II.
13 Marı́a Luisa Cabrera Pérez-Armiñan, Violencia e Impunidad en Comunidades Mayas de Guatemala:
La Masacre de Xamán desde una Perspectiva Psicosocial (Guatemala: Community Studies and Psycho-
social Action Team, 2006).
14 For a description of one such community, see, Beatriz Manz, Paradise in Ashes: A Guatemalan
Journey of Courage, Terror, and Hope (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2004).
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have been reconstituted, and in others, new political forces, including Evangelical
pastors, justices of the peace and activists linked to national Mayan organizations,
have emerged. Fear of continued violence contributes to silence about the past,
sometimes even within families, and has been manifest in myriad types of social
disfunctionality, from lynchings to somatic illnesses. It is this degree of variation
and complexity that makes international and national responses inadequate and,
to some degree, irrelevant at the local level. It requires further exploration of
local-level responses.
The Limits of Local, National and International
Responses to Armed Conflict and Social Breakdown
In this context of variation and complexity, national-level transitional justice ex-
ercises fall short if implemented alone. Such efforts may have difficulty creating
the ‘comprehensive community-based approach that includes the opinions and
ideas of those whose lives have been most directly affected.’15 In addition, they
may only come about after local communities have engaged in their own form of
recomposition, whether just or unjust.16 Local responses can help compensate for
some of the limits of other forms of post-armed conflict or transitional measures.
Truth Commissions
Truth commissions (TCs) are official, time-limited fact-finding bodies generally
charged with examining the roots, facts, patterns and consequences of dictator-
ship or armed conflict and presenting a report and recommendations to avoid
recurrence.17 As noted, Guatemala had both an official and an unofficial commis-
sion, both of which did an outstanding job of compiling testimonies and issuing
detailed written reports. Any truth commission must, because of its inherent time
and space limitations, pick and choose illustrative and exemplary cases. What is
more, a commission must pick cases based on the amount of evidence available,
with the result that they are not necessarily the cases involving the worst violations,
of which there may be no survivors to bear witness or even to list the dead. They
may not involve the most common types of violations, as a search for illustrative
cases may fail to consider all the places where there are broad patterns of violations.
Thus, in cases of massive violations, a TC report, no matter how well researched,
provides only a general, not a personal, ‘truth’ to many.
Moreover, a short-term truth-seeking endeavor cannot hope to garner
widespread trust among people in a deeply traumatized society. Testimonies taken
15 Fletcher and Weinstein, supra n 7.
16 For example, in Guatemala, the worst violations took place in the early 1980s, yet because of
protracted peace negotiations and funding issues, the truth commission did not begin work until
over a decade later and presented its findings only in 1998. See also the work of Rosalind Shaw,
Kimberly Theidon (n 38 and 39 below) and others on local-level initiatives preceding formal
investigations.
17 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge,
2000).
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may be from people who were less affected by the violence, who are more articulate
or who are members of organized groups. Without reaching all sectors of society,
a partial, fictionalized or exaggerated past of a few may become the official nar-
rative through the TC process.18 Even under the best of circumstances, a TC can
only hope to portray a snapshot of memory at a particular moment and cannot
capture the processes of memory changing over time. A one-time opportunity to
give testimony (whether publicly or privately) cannot substitute for the long-term
rehabilitation of survivors. Longer term, local-level processes are needed for that
type of healing.
National and International Trials
A key demand of human rights advocates in the wake of massive atrocities is for
those who are responsible to be individually brought to justice. In the past decade
or so, an array of international and hybrid courts have been set up because na-
tional justice was judged unavailable or untrustworthy. At the same time, millions
of dollars have been spent reforming, modernizing, streamlining and otherwise
attempting to change domestic judiciaries, prosecutors’ offices and police forces.
Despite improvements, Guatemala, like most post-armed conflict countries, still
has a justice system that remains a poor venue for those seeking justice. Years of
repression and armed conflict drain legitimacy and resources from judicial systems.
Judges, prosecutors and lawyers are killed, forced into exile or survive through com-
plicity with the regime. Post-armed conflict, judges and lawyers involved in human
rights-related cases continue to be subject to threats and are tempted by corruption
and bureaucratic inertia. These problems cannot be solved at a local level.
Judicial systems also, however, face deeper problems that can only be addressed
at the local level. Even before the armed conflict, the majority of poor, rural, Mayan
Guatemalans did not see the justice system as a source of rights vindication. Instead,
they saw it as at best irrelevant and at worst an incarnation of the discrimination
and oppression to which they had been (and are) subject since colonial times. Even
now, proceedings are opaque and held in a language that many speak imperfectly.
Maya are treated with disrespect and contempt throughout the system. Only the
poor go to jail, but when crimes are committed against the poor, suspects are hardly
ever found. Variants on this situation are common to many post-armed conflict
countries. What is more, it is unrealistic to expect even the best set of anti-impunity
and judicial reform measures to reverse centuries of warranted distrust of formal
legal systems in the short term.
Recent trials in Guatemala involving serious crimes under international law
exemplify the range of difficulty in using the justice system. In 1995, a group of
soldiers opened fire on recently returned refugees in the village of Xamán in Chisec,
Alta Verapaz, killing 11 people. A first trial resulted not only in the acquittal of the
soldiers but also, according to a case study, in a harrowing and hugely disappointing
18 Judith N. Zur, Violent Memories: Mayan War Widows in Guatemala (Boulder: Westview Press,
1998).
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experience for the survivors, who felt mistreated and alienated by the tone of the
legal proceedings.19 Only in 2004, after intense national and international pressure,
were a lieutenant and 13 soldiers sentenced to 40 years in prison for the killings.
It took 17 years and three attempts at prosecution for a court to convict notorious
PAC leader Cándido Noriega of several killings. In Colotenango, a town in the far
north of the country, a judge convicted PAC leaders in a massacre case only to
have a mob of ex-PAC members surround the jail and forcibly free the defendants,
who have still not been found.20 The national-level justice system, which utilizes
national courts and domestic judges with all their shortcomings, does not work
well for these cases.
One option might be to turn to international justice, assuming that the politi-
cal will to do so exists.21 Hybrid and international mechanisms create their own
dilemmas, however. Problems of distance and lack of ownership may be exacer-
bated by an emerging practice that posits a division of labor between national
and international justice systems. International justice is meant to focus on the
leaders and organizers of violence, or ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility,’
leaving the ‘little fish’ to national justice.22 Given this practice and the dysfunction
of national prosecutorial and judicial systems, the ‘impunity gap’ in countries like
Guatemala is likely to be significant. Although focusing on leaders and organizers
makes sense from the standpoint of both limited resources and moral culpability,
it is often unsatisfying for victims. Even though survivors recognize the army high
command’s ultimate responsibility, it may be as much of an abstraction as the state
is from a ground-level perspective.23 Rather, people are interested in seeing in the
dock the individuals they saw and heard giving orders and committing atrocities.
In addition, those who participated in and organized terror at the local level and
who continue to enjoy impunity are often ‘the most powerful local members of the
local apparatus of repression.’24 Survivors are galled and disturbed by living among
such people and seeing them flaunt their power (and, often, wealth). Survivors
feel permanently silenced and threatened by their presence. For people to perceive
19 Pérez-Armiñan, supra n 13.
20 US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Guatemala: Country
Report on Human Rights Practices (February, 2001).
21 Another option might be transnational prosecutions in national courts other than those of
Guatemala. Indeed, prosecutions are underway against members of the security forces’ high com-
mand during the early 1980s in Spain and Belgium.
22 See, Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court Agreement, 16 January 2002. The Court’s mandate
was limited to ‘those bearing the greatest responsibility.’ See, Security Council Resolution 1329, UN
Doc. S/RES/1329 (30 November 2000); and Security Council Resolution 1503, UN Doc. S/RES/1503
(28 August 2003). See also, Security Council Resolution 1534, UN Doc. S/RES/1534 (26 March 2004)
on policy related to the International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Court, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor
(September, 2003).
23 This is not to argue that survivors are not interested in seeing the army high command and others of
that ilk brought to justice. We suggest that doing so may be insufficient for many people. However,
prosecution of subordinate officials only, even if it provides a face to survivors, may result in
scapegoating of those who are less responsible.
24 Sanford, supra n 8 at 269.
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a change in their daily lives, these ex-perpetrators need to be removed from the
scene.
An example of the complexities of justice at the local level is the attempts to
prosecute those responsible for several 1982 massacres in the village of Rı́o Negro,
near Rabinal. A group of soldiers commanded by Captain José Antonio Solares
led some 40 civil patrollers from the nearby village of Xococ in the massacres.
Several hundred villagers were killed (including at least 107 children), houses and
possessions were burned and 18 children were abducted to be slaves in the homes
of PAC members. Unlike in other cases, the Xococ civil patrollers apparently acted
knowingly and voluntarily, in part because of pre-existing tensions over land in
the area. After many years, survivors asked for the bodies of the people killed to be
exhumed and filed a criminal complaint against the military and against 12 PAC
members, including the three Xococ PAC leaders. After the soldiers’ convictions
were overturned on appeal, a second trial with judges imported from outside
the region resulted in a murder verdict for the three PAC leaders and a decision
to reopen the remaining cases. An initial death sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment.25
As Kathleen Dill points out, the trial proved problematic for sorting out the
relationship between national and local justice. National groups focused on na-
tional military leaders – those most responsible – and had insufficient resources to
support both community-level and national investigations. Community organiza-
tions, meanwhile, were far more interested in prosecuting local PAC leaders, both
because they were the visible face of repression and because of their continuing
threat to communities in the region. These organizations also believed that talking
about the role of the PAC might open up a conversation about the different levels
of coercion and complicity in Xococ and other nearby villages.
The focus on national-level prosecutions may make justice advocates miss im-
portant opportunities. In the Rio Negro case, for example, once it became clear
that arrest orders would be issued against the PAC leaders, these leaders report-
edly entered into negotiations with the local victims’ group, Association for the
Integral Development of the Victims of Violence in Verapaces, Maya Achı́. The
ex-perpetrators wanted the victims’ group to support leniency in sentencing; in
exchange, the victims’ group wanted the men to admit their role and to testify
as to who had given the orders to massacre the villagers. After the PAC leaders
named Captain Solares, the victims supported commutation of their sentences.
Post-armed conflict interventions that focus on high-level prosecutions miss op-
portunities like this one not only to build cases from the bottom up but also to
meet other important community objectives.
Finally, it is hard to see how justice systems, either criminal or civil, can adequately
grapple with the ambiguities and mixed motives that color most conflicts. Criminal
25 This account is taken from Kathleen Dill’s detailed observations of the trials in, Kathleen Dill,
‘International Human Rights and Local Justice in Guatemala: The Rio Negro (Pak’oxom) and Agua
Frı́a Trials,’ Cultural Dynamics 17(3) (2005): 323–350.
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justice requires categorization as perpetrator, accomplice or innocent witness.26 It
does not deal adequately with bystanders,27 and it deals even less adequately with
the kinds of quasiforced complicity described above. It does not adequately address
the common situation of the same person (or the same family) being both victim
and perpetrator, such as individuals who hid potential victims in their houses as
they went out to kill, militia members who lost family members to the army and
people recruited as children and forced to commit atrocities in order to survive.
The shortcomings of criminal trials have become an argument, especially in
Africa, in favor of local ‘traditional justice’ mechanisms. While the debates over
gacaca jurisdiction in Rwanda or mato oput in northern Uganda are beyond the
scope of this article, we note that traditional justice only works under certain
circumstances and depends on factors such as local power dynamics, the vertical
versus horizontal nature of the conflict and the perceived legitimacy of the tradi-
tional dispute resolution.28 Traditional justice systems must not be romanticized.
They generally were designed to deal with property and family-related disputes,
not with serious crime such as homicide. They may not be suitable for complex
cases involving issues of command and indirect responsibility, as well as victims
from many communities and traditions. They can be patriarchal and exclusionary
of women and minorities. They can be coercive, putting pressure on individuals to
make their own needs subservient to those of the community. Traditional justice
systems may assume a degree of community knowledge and cohesion that, if it
ever existed at all, certainly does not exist in dispersed and reshuffled communities
where many original inhabitants have fled to the cities or left the country altogether.
They generally rely on a high degree of case-by-case discretion that can easily be-
come arbitrariness. Finally, because of all these variables, such mechanisms may
be appropriate in some parts of a country but not in others.
The National Reparations Program and Other Reparations Efforts
In the wake of large-scale violence or repression, reparations can be one of the
most tangible manifestations of a government’s recognition of victims’ dignity
and rights, and of its commitment not to repeat past wrongs. In an extremely
poor country, reparations may make a real difference in the lives of those who lost
everything. Reparations can be material or symbolic, individual or collective.29
26 For a discussion of the way in which criminal law creates a bright line between victims and
wrongdoers, see, Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (Ardsley: Transaction,
1997).
27 See, Laurel Fletcher, ‘From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal
Justice,’ Michigan Journal of International Law 26(4) (2005): 1013–1096.
28 The Rwandan government set up community-level courts, ostensibly based on traditional law, to
try the tens of thousands of accused in the 1994 genocide. Timothy Longman, ‘Local Justice in
Rwanda,’ in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth vs. Justice, ed. Naomi
Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Mato oput,
or the drinking of the bitter root, is a ceremony of the Acholi people of northern Uganda that is
used to reintegrate and reconcile former enemies.
29 See, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas,’ Hastings International and Com-
parative Law Review 27(2) (2004): 157–219.
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In practice, when operating in the context of poor societies, a weak state and
many victims, reparations programs face many challenges. For one, the state may
not be in a position to efficiently and fairly administer programs involving a great
deal of money. Like Guatemala, a country may have little or no tradition of a
democratic process and still less administrative capacity. It may have a long history
of self-dealing, capture of popular organizations, corruption, influence-peddling
and the like, now exacerbated by the transformation of criminal and intelligence
networks into organized crime rings.30 Into this scenario comes a burst of foreign
aid money for both government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
dries up after a few years with the emergence of a post-armed conflict situation
elsewhere. Such a country also may have an unhealthy tradition of centralization.31
By working mostly from the capital, organizations run the risk of misunderstanding
community needs and realities, as well as of stretching limited resources too thin.
The establishment of large-scale social reconstruction projects in this context risks
having them collapse into infighting over patronage and spoils, administrative
disarray and cynicism.
Guatemala’s considerable efforts at reparations illustrate some of these diffi-
culties. On paper, Guatemala’s reparations program is impressive. The PNR has
a 10-year mandate with a planned annual budget of about US$37.5 million. In
its original plan, the program was multifaceted. It included restitution of lands,
legal certainty of title, houses and seed capital to replace lost tools and create a
means of making a living, as well as economic compensation for personal injuries
and the death of family members ranging from some US$2,300 to US$5,000 per
person. The program planned to do a census of victims and massacre sites, in
addition to providing medical care, psycho-social attention and acts of dignifica-
tion of the victim. Scholarships, a small microcredit fund, training of traditional
healers, support for traditional medicine and other services were contemplated.
Two committees were to administer the program: one of government officials and
one of civil society representatives elected from among organizations representing
victims, Mayans, women and human rights activists and known as the Technical
Clarification Commission for Victims.32
In practice, difficulties arose. The civil society organizations fought bitterly with
each other, their debates degenerating into charges and countercharges of racism
and race baiting.33 With so many different constituencies – and potential patronage
opportunities – the Technical Clarification Commission for Victims had difficulty
finding a single voice, and the government was content to let the NGOs fight
30 Statement before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, ‘Guatemala: A Human Rights Update,’
by Adriana Beltrán, Program Officer for Guatemala, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA),
16 October 2003, http://www.wola.org/central america/guatemala/testimony chrc oct03.htm.
31 This is a tradition common to Latin American countries. See, Richard L. Harris, ‘Centralization and
Decentralization in Latin America,’ in Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in
Developing Countries, ed. G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983).
32 Acuerdo Gubernativo 258–2003, 7 May 2003, and Acuerdo Gubernativo 188–2004, 7 July 2004,
contain the basic structure and definitions of the program.
33 See, for example, the press release by a number of Mayan organizations on 15 July 2005 calling for
the resignation of the program’s executive director on charges of racism.
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it out. By the end of 2005, the program was in shambles from infighting. The
government took it over, sidelining its civil society members. Since then, the
program’s main activities seem to be distributing checks in a few selected areas
and providing limited support for NGO-led exhumations and related support
programs.34 To compound the problem, the reparations issue became conflated
with the question of payments to former PAC members for services rendered to
the military. Organized and vocal groups of ex-PAC claimed that the state owed
them millions of dollars in unpaid wages and reparations for their suffering during
the conflict. The government agreed to exclude PACs from the PNR but to pay
them from a separate fund. At the ground level, this compromise looked to many
people like the government was distributing checks right and left. Efforts to use
reparations as a means of dignification of victims rather than as a simple handout
have been lost in the infighting and confusion over what constitutes a victim and
why.35
Smaller amounts distributed to many different groups at the local level, with ad-
equate training and accountability, may allow reparations programs to avoid such
problems. By staying smaller, or at least having decentralized offices and budgets,
agencies and groups are less likely to fall victim to the perverse incentives and
organizational problems that access to large amounts of money can cause. Decen-
tralization is now recognized as a potential component of responsive, responsible
public administration.36 Indeed, plans for the Peruvian Integral Reparations Plan
include a large component funded and administered by local and regional govern-
ments. Localized reparations projects mean, however, that uniformity is sacrificed
and that resources may flow only to the most organized or most compelling loca-
tions. We suggest that this happens even under a nationally administered scheme,
with the difference being that communities have less ownership of the process and
middlemen (be they bureaucrats or consultants) take a larger cut.
Guatemalan Local Post-armed Conflict Initiatives
In addition to truth telling, justice and reparations, the transitional justice liter-
ature has begun to grapple with the independent need to create some kind of
dialogue, mutual recognition or other processes to knit back together the fabric
of communities deliberately destroyed or damaged by the armed conflict. This is
especially important where communities turned on each other or on themselves
(horizontal conflicts), where the wealth and power disparities between the two
34 To be fair, the PNR has encountered numerous difficulties in creating a reliable database, especially
given the destruction of personal documentation during the conflict.
35 This problem has been exacerbated in some communities by the simultaneous existence of repara-
tions payments to massacre survivors based on judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. For a fuller description, see, Marcie Mersky and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Guatemala,’ in Vic-
tims Unsilenced: The Inter-American Human Rights System and Transitional Justice in Latin America
(Washington, DC: Due Process of Law Foundation, 2007).
36 See, for example, Walter B. Stöhr, Josefa S. Edralin and Devyani Mani, ed., Decentralization, Gov-
ernance, and the New Planning for Local-Level Development (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001);
Pranab Bardhan, ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development,’ Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 16(4) (2002): 185–205.
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sides are minimal and where former enemies need to live side by side. Community
healing, it seems, is not an automatic consequence of truth telling or of justice,
although both might be components of it. Rather, it is a context-specific exercise
that may involve ritual, religious practices, public discussion, apology, vetting,
punishment and/or reparations.
A number of experiences have provided new impetus to thinking about commu-
nity rebuilding. In East Timor, the Truth, Reception and Reconciliation Commis-
sion organized community reconciliation processes that incorporated traditional
adat dispute resolution, including a public airing of facts, apology and/or repara-
tion and acceptance of responsibility, in exchange for conditional amnesty for low-
level offenders.37 The water rituals of Mozambique and Sierra Leone cleansed child
soldiers of their crimes and reincorporated them into communities with a cool,
nonviolent heart.38 In Peru, local communities found ways first to dehumanize and
then to rehumanize members of Sendero Luminoso through public reincorpora-
tion ceremonies that involved truth telling, apology and symbolic punishment.39 In
Cambodia, religious and local civic authorities staged ceremonies to welcome back
Khmer Rouge soldiers who laid down their arms in the 1980s.40 Although Rwandan
gacaca – a traditional dispute resolution mechanism – has been appropriated by
the government and substantially modified, in the wake of the 1994 genocide,
some communities spontaneously employed gacaca techniques to resolve land and
other disputes.41
These experiences are local almost by definition, as they rely heavily on spe-
cific cultural traditions and mass community involvement. They generally occur
without central government or international intervention and are initiated by
local religious or community actors. In Guatemala, the continuing stranglehold
on local power by those who committed atrocities has limited the extent of such
initiatives, though they may become more important going forward, as detailed
below. Guatemala’s post-armed conflict experiences with local-level initiatives en-
compass a wide range of activities that combine elements of truth telling, local
justice, commemoration and the creation of new spaces for dialogue. Almost all
the initiatives share an emphasis on Mayan practice, a connection to present-day
issues and an effort to tailor activities to the specific needs of a place and people.
37 Patrick Burgess, ‘East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process: A New Tool for Reconciliation?,’
in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth vs. Justice, ed. Naomi Roht-Arriaza
and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
38 Alcinda Honwana, Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Rural Mozambique (Lon-
don: Conciliation Resources, 1998); Rosalind Shaw, ‘Remembering to Forget: Unmaking War for
Child Ex-Combatants in Northern Sierra Leone’ (paper presented to the Nordic Africa Institute,
Uppsala, 21 May 2003). For an account of similar experiences in Uganda with the reintegration of
Lord’s Resistance Army fighters, see, Marc Lacey, ‘Atrocity Victims in Uganda Choose to Forgive,’
The New York Times, April 18, 2005.
39 Kimberly Theidon, ‘Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation in Postwar Peru,’
Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(3) (2006): 433–457.
40 Jens Iverson, ‘Center Stage: The Contributions of Non-State Actors to Accountability and Recon-
ciliation in Cambodia’ (unpublished manuscript, December 2005).
41 Lars Waldorf, ‘Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice,’
Temple Law Review 79(1) (2006): 1–87.
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Houses of Memory
In several communities hard hit by massacres, community members and support-
ers have developed variations on community museums. The museums are designed
by local groups and display local customs and history, as well as making reference to
the massacres and destruction. They have been attempted in Panzós (Alta Verapaz),
Rabinal and Rı́o Negro (Baja Verapaz) and Santiago Atitlán (Sololá),42 which were
sites of large-scale massacres and repression. They are also areas where survivors
have been particularly well organized and proactive in addressing the legacy of the
violence. These museums, tailored by each community to its own experience, are
known as ‘houses of memory.’ They are a visual remembrance of past and ongoing
community customs, witnesses to the lives of victims of the internal armed conflict
and places for preserving the memories of those who survived. Houses of memory
continue and deepen the documentation work begun by the TC and combine it
with compilations of oral histories and other commemorative techniques.
The community museum in Panzós commemorates one of the country’s first
large-scale rural massacres, which occurred in 1978. Working with ideas of com-
munity museums and collective healing, the Historial 43 for Peace of Panzós has
three missions: compiling and publishing records of local cultural practices and
traditions before the violence and local experiences of repression through the sign-
ing of the peace accords; building physical memorials; and erecting a community
peace museum in Panzós and commemorative rooms throughout the area. The
central aim of the project is community participation and direction. Thus, leaders
of the community – two from each village, elected by community elders according
to Mayan tradition – participate closely with Historial employees in every facet
of the Historial ’s work. The Historial produced a publication based on hundreds
of testimonies about local experiences of la violencia collected by local ‘histori-
cal promoters,’ anthropologists living in the area and Historial employees.44 This
publication is intended as a supplement to the CEH and REMHI reports. It brings
to light the specifics of the regional experience, which was impossible to do at the
time of the nation-wide truth-seeking programs. Furthermore, the Historial was
able to record more testimonies not only because it concentrated its efforts on
a smaller region than the CEH or REMHI but also because it was connected in
the long term to the community and therefore had the community’s trust. The
Historial plans to publish a book in Spanish and Q’eqchi’ that documents local
customs and traditions, such as midwifery and religious practices, and how they
changed during and after the internal armed conflict.
42 Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz and Sololá are three of Guatemala’s 22 states, known as departamentos.
‘Houses of memory’ are not limited to Guatemala – they have been used in Peru, El Salvador
and elsewhere. The District 6 Museum in South Africa, which recreates a community lost to
apartheid-era evictions, is another variant on this approach.
43 Historial refers to the specific center organized in Panzós, Alta Verapaz, as a local ‘house of memory.’
44 Carlos A, Paredes, Te Llevaste Mis Palabras (Tomo II): Testimonios de Sobrevivientes de la Violencia
Poĺıtica en comunidades del pueblo Q’eqchi’ (Guatemala: Community Studies and Psycho-social
Action Team, 2006).
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Originally, the Historial planned to work with all the communities in the Panzós
area, but almost from the project’s inception, it encountered problems with work-
ing simultaneously with communities composed primarily of survivors and com-
munities largely made up of former PACs. Many survivors refused to work with
former PACs, as the wounds of the conflict were still too fresh. The local gov-
ernment of Cahoboncito, a village dominated by ex-PACs, donated a one-room
building to the project for use as a commemorative room. The Historial’s peace
museum project and commemorative rooms depend on such donations, thereby
necessitating the continued partnership with the Cahoboncito community. The
Historial decided to accept the donation and the building is now used as a com-
munity center for Cahoboncito. Although the project has not yet led to dialogue
between the ex-PACs and survivors, both groups have the space to express and
come to terms with their memories. The Historial’s organizers hope that some
dialogue will eventually result from the project.
Exhumations and Memorials
In the wake of violent conflict, one of the most oft-heard demands of survivors is
that the state (or the warring parties) identify where the bodies of loved ones are
buried and exhume the bodies for proper burial according to local tradition. In
addition to serving legal purposes by providing evidence for eventual prosecutions,
exhumations serve as a focal point for local-level community engagement and
potential healing. They also can be a source of further conflict.
Guatemala is riddled with clandestine and unmarked graves. Part of the military’s
strategy of terror was to leave bodies in town squares and along the sides of roads,
and to prohibit family members from recovering or properly burying the dead. As is
true in other conflict and post-armed conflict societies, the absence of appropriate
burial ceremonies and of a place to mourn and remember the dead has been a
source of anguish in Guatemala,45 especially as the local culture posits a continuing
relationship between the dead and the living that requires proper attention to the
dead.
Since the early 1990s, two groups of forensic anthropologists have been hard
at work exhuming clandestine gravesites. Over 700 have been discovered thus
far.46 The exhumations are deeply connected to community mental health and
commemoration efforts, as well as to local justice processes. The process requires
extensive preparation of family members (both for finding the remains and for the
risk of not finding them) and has often become a collective task for a community.
Community members provide food for forensic anthropology teams and help with
digging and erecting the temporary structures needed for a major exhumation.
Exhumation of a clandestine grave cannot proceed without the presence of the
Public Prosecutor’s office or a judge, and the identification of bodies, by law,
45 See, Eric Stover and Rachel Shigekane, ‘Exhumation of Mass Graves: Balancing Legal and Human-
itarian Needs,’ in My Neigbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity,
ed. Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
46 See, Sanford, supra n 8.
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triggers a criminal investigation.47 For local communities where PACs were in-
volved in the killings, the tie-in to the criminal justice system raises the stakes
because the judicial authorities are there to take statements from witnesses, who
may well implicate individuals still living in or near the area. A pending exhumation
often leads to renewed threats against victims’ families and local social activists.
The presence of judicial authorities also may impede the ability of communities
to use the exhumations as a moment for acknowledgement of wrongdoing. While
several anecdotal accounts exist of former PAC members and supporters helping at
exhumations and even showing remorse toward victims’ families during the pro-
cess, any public acknowledgement of responsibility for the crimes would activate
an automatic duty on the part of the Public Prosecutor or judge to file a crim-
inal complaint against the individual(s) involved. Thus, PAC members generally
remain silent.
Once bodies have been exhumed and, where possible, identified, many local
communities organize massive public reburial ceremonies. These are moving,
impressive affairs, during which hundreds of people turn out to accompany the
coffins to the burial ground, prayers are said, food and memories are shared and
a marker or memorial is erected. Where no bodies have been recovered, plaques,
markers or memorials have been set up at the massacre site. All memorials include
the names of the dead. Some have large crosses, while others have Mayan altars used
in traditional prayer ceremonies. The memorials can become quite elaborate, as
well as contested. For example, outside Rabinal, the Rio Negro memorials involve
a series of murals depicting the massacres in the area and several different markers
with victims’ names. After civil patrollers from Xococ pulled down a first, modest
memorial, village associations built a bigger, concrete memorial and inscribed it
with the names of the murdered villagers, this time adding that they were ‘killed by
the civil patrollers from Xococ.’ Similar murals exist in Comalapa and other towns
of the Chimaltenango area. They often constitute the first community recognition
of local history.
These initiatives are organized and financed at the local level, sometimes with
support from national NGOs, local community organizations and religious au-
thorities. Because they arise from local, deeply felt initiatives, they are protected
and ‘owned’ by community members. They stand in stark contrast to the lack of
any kind of national memorial relating to the armed conflict. Although individual
plaques marking sites of killings dot Guatemala City, no central cemetery marker
or memorial has been erected by the state and a planned museum has not yet
opened its doors.
Psycho-social Community Interventions
Exhumations and reburials are stressful for survivors, as they revive old memories
and traumas. In some communities, people have never spoken of what happened
to them, even within their own families. This is especially true of women victims of
47 In practice, few identifications lead to a criminal complaint being filed, much less pursued.
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sexual violence. A culture of fear is one in which trauma-associated stresses become
exacerbated, making daily life more difficult by affecting emotional stability and
a person’s sense of worth. A number of groups have developed methodologies for
working with communities before, during and after exhumations to combat the
culture of fear developed over years of terror and to allow people to begin to speak
and make sense of their experiences. Accompanying programs and individual
and group mental health programs emerged as a response to the shifts in culture
that followed the 36 years of conflict in Guatemala. Although each has its own
techniques for alleviating psychological stresses and engaging communities in
dialogue, all of the programs use a long-term approach in their work. Much of
their success lies in how much the community trusts them. Trust in Guatemala is
built by demonstrating that an organization will not abandon the community as
the government and the guerrillas both did during the internal armed conflict. In
order to build trust and endure, an organization must be embedded in the area.
A number of psycho-social intervention programs are firmly grounded in the
Mayan ‘cosmovision,’ an abstract term that incorporates Mayan philosophy, ideol-
ogy and history. Key elements of the Mayan cosmovision are belief in place-based
spirituality related to the local landscape, the interconnectedness of nature and
people and deference to elders. Each community interprets the specificities of this
cosmovision differently, and some places have more memory of the old ways of
doing things than others, where specific rituals need to be reinvented or readjusted
in light of present needs. In the context of exhumations, fire-based ceremonies are
often used to cleanse survivors of guilt and to allow them to communicate with
those who were killed.48
By incorporating Mayan traditions into their work, these organizations find that
they are more accessible to community members who might be skeptical about
a program that relates to the internal armed conflict. Moreover, they hold that
attempting to demystify cosmovision to a larger Guatemalan public, including
ladinos, is one of the first steps in the rehumanization of all those affected by
and involved in a perennially racist and exclusionary society. Most organizations
working with Mayan rituals not only address post-armed conflict trauma but
also incorporate work either on new forms of dispute resolution or on health,
education and empowerment. Their focus is not only on survivors as victims but
also on survivors as bearers of a valuable history and culture.
Not all psycho-social intervention programs in Guatemala claim to use Mayan
cosmovision as the central tenet in their work. Yet, those most successful at working
with large groups of community members and earning their trust operate on a
small scale, which allows them to incorporate some community practices into their
methodology.
48 For an exposition of cosmovision, see, Maria Faviana Cochoy Alva et al., Cosmovisión Maya, Plenitud
de la Vida (Guatemala: United Nations Development Programme, 2006). See also, interviews with
Domingo Hernández by Laura Arriaza, 2004; and by Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 2006.
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Dispute Resolution
A number of locally based organizations49 are using old, revived and reformed
Mayan practices for resolution of present day disputes. This work is driven in
part by the persistence of tensions around land and resources and in part by bur-
geoning domestic violence and common criminality, which has spawned incidents
of lynching.50 It is also driven by the continuing dysfunction and discriminatory
practices of the formal justice system, which has not recovered the trust of most
Mayans. By tailoring their mediation and dispute resolution techniques to both the
culture and the underlying issues and history of each area, the groups are trying to
set the stage for a new relationship within communities. They are also beginning
to redefine the relationship between justice and the state in a multicultural soci-
ety through methods that do not yet but may eventually play a role in resolving
disputes over the past. The Mayan belief system stresses the goal of community
reintegration, not punishment, for those who have committed a crime. Processes
for dealing with these individuals usually involve a public meeting which includes
the family, victim(s) and other affected persons. Punishments may include public
discussion and acknowledgement by the wrongdoer, or, in serious cases, whipping
with a tree switch, other physical discomforts, or temporary or permanent banish-
ment or ostracism. Some of these methods are of course highly controversial from
the standpoint of international human rights law, and their indigenous nature is
disputed within the communities as well as more generally.51
The resurgence of such traditional methods has given rise to a lively debate in
Guatemala about the proper relationship between informal justice systems and the
formal justice system. Although the peace accords called for constitutional reform
to institutionalize the validity of autonomous Mayan justice systems, the reforms
were never passed. In a few cases, the public prosecutor has accepted punishments
meted out through the informal system as barring further punishment on double
jeopardy grounds, but the practice is not uniform or regulated. Defensoŕıas work
closely with the official ombudsmans’ office (Procuraduŕıa de Derechos Humanos),
but the division of labor is unclear. A number of proposals for how to structure the
relationship of the two systems are in play, but the outcome remains undetermined.
We found little evidence that these Mayan cosmovision-based dispute resolution
practices have been applied to tensions arising from the legacy of the armed
conflict. This is partly because more than 20 years have passed since the worst
massacres occurred, and people in many places no longer base their identity solely
49 There are a number of such groups, including Defensoŕıa Maya, Defensoŕıa Indı́gena Ki’che, Saq’be
and Ukux’be in Chimaltenango.
50 It is also perhaps an attempt to reappropriate the use of Mayan symbols and beliefs employed by
the military, which tried to create the belief that the military embodied the spirits of the mountains.
See, Richard Wilson, Maya Resurgence in Guatemala: Q’Eqchi Experiences (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1999).
51 Some argue that physical punishments are a colonial relic, while others relate them to the period of
counterinsurgency and military domination of communities. See, Jesús Gómez, Son los Azotes Parte
de las Sanciones en el Sistema Juŕıdico Maya? (Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landı́var, Facultad de
Ciencias Jurı́dicas y Sociales, 5 July 2007).
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on their status as victim or perpetrator. Although conflict-based tensions persist,
they have been joined by newer sources of tension – economic, familial or political –
that often involve different groupings. Paradoxically, while in some senses the use of
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms comes too late, it may also be too soon,
as the local power relationships between former perpetrators and their victims
continue largely to favor the first group. Ex-perpetrators have little interest in
reintegrating into a community or in acknowledging past acts, so no grounds exist
for invoking any local dispute resolution process. The potential is there, however.
We were told of a recent case in which a Kich’e widow invoked the help of a
Defensoŕıa Indı́gena office to reclaim land stolen by a PAC member years before.
Whether the techniques of dialogue and mediation used to deal with thievery and
thuggishness can cope with the sequelae of plunder and massacre is unknown.
Conclusions
Local-level initiatives can tailor their strategies to the unique experiences of each
geographic region and community. They can foster the integration of cultural
practices and promote participation and a sense of ownership, which makes such
initiatives sustainable beyond the short window of external project financing.
Certain problems emerge from working at the local level, however, especially
for those trying to design post-armed conflict social reconstruction policies. First,
the kind of spontaneous, culturally specific commemoration seen in Guatemala,
and the local dialogue and reintegration ceremonies seen elsewhere, may lose their
value if ‘programmed’ or even encouraged by governments or international actors.
After all, much of the strength of such initiatives is that they are insider-driven and
a product of local initiative. The kinds of local-level initiatives that seem to work
best are not formalized in western systems of aid and consultation, much less in
legal commitments, and may be so place- and time-specific that they cannot be
duplicated.
Nonetheless, transitional justice practitioners need to look carefully and take
into account such local dynamics. The existence and nature of local practices may
provide important clues as to what would or would not resonate at a national level,
what kinds of ‘reconciliation’ have already occurred and what remains to be done.
In addition, the careful documentation and study of such practices is important
in assessing the success or failure of a ‘transition,’ as well as in understanding what
people conceive of as justice.
Second, while the actual development of local-level practices may need to be
left to the local population, governments, international agencies and transitional
justice practitioners at least can aim to ‘do no harm.’ For example, an amnesty
law or de facto amnesty may give one side of the conflict impunity that allows
perpetrators to avoid engaging in any recognition of their acts or dialogue with
their victims. In Guatemala, the absence of a ‘crown witness’ law that protects
lower level experpetrators who provide valuable information for the criminal
prosecution of higher ups – and who sometimes are prepared to acknowledge
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their own role and express remorse – impedes local dialogue efforts by making
perpetrators reluctant to talk.
Third, in the design of national post-armed conflict initiatives, space can be left
for local precursors or follow-ons. For example, a truth commission can plan on
working through regional offices not only to obtain and collate testimony but also
to identify and support efforts to deepen local understandings of what happened
through community mapping or community museums. Many times, the chance to
speak to an official commission will provide a mobilizing spark for communities,
whether it takes the form of rehearsing testimony or organizing hearings and
taking statements. These efforts should not be seen simply in relation to the overall
national report, but rather as starting points for ongoing local initiatives.
Similarly, exhumations are not simply about recovering bodies or even about
preparing judicial cases – they can be starting points both for commemorative
activities and for local-level psycho-social intervention work. The presence of
sympathetic, trained outsiders over a sustained period of time may provide com-
munity organizations with a neutral party that could help them think about what
a fruitful dialogue with ex-adversaries might entail. In some areas, local power
disparities may impede such dialogue, but in others the creation of a safe space and
a neutral arbiter steeped in local culture may provide an opening. This is especially
true in areas where many of those who collaborated with the military did so under
duress.
Attention to the local level means thinking specifically about rebalancing lo-
cal power away from victimizers and their supporters. This involves rethinking
national trial strategies to better balance trials of leaders and organizers with in-
vestigations and prosecutions of local-level operatives who continue to exercise
power at the municipal and village levels. In addition, restitution of land and
household goods can help alleviate some of the extreme poverty that keeps many
victims and survivors marginalized. Reparations and restitution programs that
involve the (re)building of destroyed or non-existent infrastructure may, if seen
as a benefit brought about by the status and agency of those who were in the
past victims, help to rebalance power by enhancing the prestige of the formerly
victimized and marginalized. The same goes for vetting local military, police and
political officeholders.
Finally, a local-level focus might prompt some reevaluation of funding for tran-
sitional justice initiatives. The time frame would have to be considerably longer,
meaning decades. Decentralization and responsiveness to bottom-up initiatives
with small amounts of funding, rather than large-scale megaprograms, would
align post-armed conflict initiatives with recent approaches in the field of devel-
opment. A focus on the local might lead merely to increased funding for local
NGOs, which would admittedly perpetuate the weakness of the state and the
project-driven dynamic that now transforms all social activism into an NGO seek-
ing external project funding. This dynamic has hobbled the reemergence of viable
social movements in Guatemala. Keeping things small might create opportunities
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for local residents (even very poor ones) to contribute part or all of the financing
of ‘their’ projects.
We are not arguing that national or international initiatives should be aban-
doned. Rather, we suggest they should be enriched and more carefully calibrated.
The lessons learned regarding the importance of a localized approach to social
reconstruction underscore the role of local communities as cornerstones of wider
scale human organizations, and the ways in which different post-armed conflict
strategies work together. We are arguing for a shift in emphasis, a longer time frame
and more attention to the specifics not only of each country but also of each area.
These would create a social reconstruction process that reaches deep into the lives
of ordinary people, with positive effect.







ibrary on June 16, 2016
http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
